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TERMINATION OF PERSONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE CONTRACTS BY CANCELLATION
OR NONRENEWAL
PROPOSALS for federal health insurance legislation1 have sparked
a continuing controversy throughout the past two decades.2 These
proposals emanate from a growing realization of the nation's health
needs,3 but have been subbornly resisted by the medical profession4 and
private insurance companies. One of the major arguments of these
groups has been that the economic burdens of society resulting from
'The National Health Bill of 1939, S. 162o, 76th Cong., ist Sess. (1939); The
Copper Bill, S. 366o, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (11940); The Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill,
S. 16o6, 79th Cong., ist Sess. (1945), see 91 CONG. REC. 10989 (1945). In 1947
four important bills were introduced into the Senate: The Administration Bill, S. 1679,
8oth Cong., ist Sess. (94.7); The Flanders-Ives Bill, S. 1970, Both Cong., ist Sess.
(1947)); The Hill Bill, S. 1456, Soth Cong., ist Sess. (1947); and the Taft Bill, S.
i58z, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. (1947). See GAGLIARDO, AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE
460 (1949) 5 Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 292 (1950).
For a text of President Eisenhower's message to Congress (January i8, 1954) sug-
gesting the Federal Reinsurance Bill of 1954, H.R. Doc. No. 298, 83d Cong. ist Sess.
(1954), see 36 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 96 (Jan. 29, 1954), oo CONG. REC.
379-38z (I954). See also Drucker, The Medical Insurance We Need the Most, 206
HARPERS 51 (May, 1953); Willcox, The Nature, Scope and Constitutionality of the
Proposed Federal Compulsory Health Insurance, 35 IOWA L. REV. 169 (i949).
' See generally, BACHMAN, THE ISSUE OF COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE (1948)5
BAUR, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE OR GOVERNMENT IN MEDICINE (1948) ; CABET, THE
DOCTOR'S BILL (1935); EWING, How SHALL WE PAY FOR MEDICAL CARE (1949);
EWING, THE NATION'S HEALTH: A TEN YEAR PROGRAM (1938); GOLDMANN, PUBLIC
MEDICAL CARE (1945); GOLDMANN, VOLUNTARY MEDICAL CARE INSURANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1948) 5 JOSEPHSON, YOUR LIFE IS THEIR TOY (1940); KERSHAW,
AN APPROACH TO SOCIAL MEDICINE (1946) i ROBERTS, THE COST OF HEALTH (952)
SERBEIN, PAYING FOR MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED STATES (1953); SIMPSON, COM-
PULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE (1943) 5 SINAI, ANDERSON, and DOLLAR, HEALTH IN-
SURANCE (1946) ; WILSON, COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE (1947). See also,
Campbell and Campbell, Compulsory Health Insurance: The Economic Issues, 66 Q.J.
ECON. I (Feb., 1952) 5 Falk, Medical Care Insurance-Lessons from Voluntary and
Compulsory Plans, 41 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 553 (May, i95i); Frothingham, The
Need for National Health Insurance, 35 IOWA L. REV. 16€ (1949) ; Goldmann, Major
4reas of Achievement and Deficiency, 41 AM. ECON. REV. 626 (May, 1951). 
' For recent samplings of this increased public interest, see Hall, When Sickness
Strikes a Family, 88 SURVEY 26 (Jan. 1952) ; Harris, The High Cost of Health, 128
NEW REPUBLIC 16 (Jan. 1953) i Hutchison, The High Cost of Health, 174 NATION
i52 (Feb. 16, 1952).
' See Comment, The American Medical Alssociation: Power, Purpose and Politics in
Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 938 (i953).
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health disabilities' can be adequately borne by voluntary health insur-
ance.6  Undeniably, the great expansion 7 of voluntary health insurance
over this same period of time has encouraged much experimentation,
and with good results. By virtue of the progress thus being achieved
in this field, it is probable that reasonably adequate medical-costs pro-
tection will be available to the bulk of the population in the foreseeable
future.8
'The economic burden arising from sickness is two-fold: the direct burden due to
the cost of cure and treatment, and the indirect burden resulting from loss of employment
due to sickness. To an extent, protection against the latter exists under Workmen's
Compensation Laws. As well, in four states there are statutory disability laws providing
some measure of protection for unemployment due to sickness not incurred in the scope
of employment. For discussion of these laws see, GAGLIARDO, AMERICAN SOCIAL IN-
SURANCE, op. cit. supra note x, at 577. Private insurance also extends coverage to loss
of employment due to disability. Faulkner, Replacement of Income-Personal Contracts,
in ACCIDENT AND SICKNESS INSURANCE z6 (McCahan ed. 1954).
' In general, voluntary health insurance in the United States is classified into three
different types according to the insuring organization: insurance companies; Blue Cross
and Blue Shield5 and Independent Plans, which are usually prepayment plans sponsored
by local medical societies. The primary difference in the contracts of these organizations
is that those of the insurance companies are for cash benefits and the latter two are for
"service" benefits. See HEALTH INSURANCE COUNCIL, THE HEALTH INSURANCE STORY
30 (1953). Statistics as to the number of hospital insurance policyholders at the end
of 1954 give some indication of the relative size of each. Insurance companie--56
million5 Blue Cross and Blue Shield- 4 6 million; Independent Plans- million.
HEALTH INSURANCE COUNCIL, THE EXTENT OF VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE IN
THE UNITED STATES 4 (1955). The discussion here will be limited to insurance com-
panies.
'Statistics indicate a remarkable expansion. The basic coverage type is hospitaliza-
tion insurance, and at the end of 954. it was estimated that over xot million persons
held hospitalization policies, as compared with 32 million in x94.5, and 76 million in
S95o. The number of persons insured against surgical expenses at the end of 1954 was
86 million, as opposed to 12 million in 1945. Insurance against medical expenses is
now held by 47 million persons as opposed to 4 million in 1945. HEALTH INSURANCE
COUNCIL, id. at 7. In number of policyholders, accident and health insurance exceeds
life insurance, which has 93 million insured [Id. at 131, though the latter is still the
largest line in terms of premiums paid. Hanna, Accident and Health Insurance De-
velopment: Competition v'. Law, [1955] INS. L.J. 318. In terms of benefits, voluntary
insurance paid over 2.7 billion dollars in claims in 1954. HEALTH INSURANCE COUNCIL,
op. cit. supra at iz.
8 The fact that ioo million Americans have some sort of health insurance does not
mean that a goal has been reached. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Hobby's
suggested aim is 130 million policyholders. But a statement of the goal in these terms
places an undue emphasis on quantity and overlooks the quality of this insurance.
Hanna, op. cit. supra note 7, at 327. What is reasonably adequate protection will
always be subject to conjecture, but few would hazard to suggest that it now exists for
the majority of those presently insured, in the light of estimates that less than 2o% of
private expenditures for medical (as opposed to hospital and surgical) care are indemni-
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However, for all the progress of voluntary health insurance, ade-
quate protection has not been extended to certain very important problem
areas, which include the poor, those who suffer prolonged illness,9 and
the aged and the infirm.10 Although strenuous efforts are being made by
the private companies to expand their coverage to these areas, 1 only par-
tial success is likely, since the very nature of health insurance restricts
even limited protection to those among the reasonably healthy who can
afford it.
12
fled under insurance plans. BOWERS, The Nature of Accident and Sickness Insurance, in
ACCIDENT AND SICKNESS INSURANCE xi (McCahan ed. 1954).
' Extended illness has become a major social problem. Because of low claim limits
in the average policy, only a fraction of the cost of a very serious illness is indemnified
by insurance. It has been estimated that, though only one-fifth of the number of illnesses
are so prolonged that they are not covered by present policies, their costs aggregate
one-half of the nation's medical bill. Drucker, op. cit. supra note x, at 52. The serious-
ness of the problem, and the unlikelihood of its solution by present methods [but see
note nI infra], prompted a presidential proposal in 1954 that Congress enact legislation
to enable the government to "reinsure" private carriers who undertook to cover the risk
at a standard premium rate. See note i supra.
"0 These categories overlap, yet certain bases for distinction may be observed. For
an analysis along these lines, see Holman and Cooley, Voluntary Health Insurance in
the United States, 35 IOWA L. REV. 183 (i949).
"' Of the above three problem areas, the progress being achieved in the field of pro-
tection against "catastrophic" illness is the most promising, Recent experiments in
"major-medical" policies have proven quite marketable, as attested by their significant
growth. In 195i, only about izo,ooo persons held such policies, as compared with
2,350,000 at the end of 1954. From 1953 to 1954 alone, the increase was 83%.
HEALTH INSURANCE COUNCIL, op. cit. supra note 6, at 9. This type of policy is char-
acterized by high claim limits of either $2,000, $5,ooo or So,ooo per illness, per year,
or both, and a proportionate deductible provision of $oo, $2oo or $5oo. SMITH,
Meeting Medical and Surgical Expenses, in ACCIDENT AND SICKNESS INSURANCE 81
(McCahan ed. 1954). As well, there is a co-insurance provision of 20% or 25%,
which enlists the financial self-interest of the insured in preventing the payment of
needless benefits. Sometimes a "major-medical" policy is used in conjunction with a
regular policy, with a "corridor" coverage range between two policies, in which the in-
sured is responsible for his own protection. Hanna, A New Direction in Health Insur-
ance, 45 AM. EcoN. REv. 2 (Feb. 1955).
As nearly half of the claims paid under health insurance policies are for $50 or
under, a higher degree of economy is attained in the "major-medical" policy, not only
in savings from small claim elimination, but in greatly reduced administrative expense.
Hanna, op. cit. supra note 7, at 327.
12 Any protection through voluntary insurance for the aged and those with bad
medical records is sparse, and where it exists, tenuous as well. Most companies limit
the age of their insureds to sixty years, Miller, Health Insurance for Our Older Citizens
-Present Cooverage and Future Prospects, [1954] INS. L.J. 113, and eliminate those
not in good health by their underwriting standards. See SOMMER, Underwriting Re-
insurance and Claim Adjustnent-Personal Commercial Contracts, in ACCIDENT AND
SICKNESS INSURANCE 129 (McCahan ed. 1954). Those who venture accepting such
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Consequently, as to these problem areas, it must be recognized that
some form of federal subsidy will be necessary.' 3 It is therefore in the
interest of everyone concerned-the companies, those now unprotected
by the voluntary system, the federal government, and the taxpayers-
that the extent of this federal subsidy be minimized by expanding the
voluntary insurance as far as its inherent limitations will allow. The
function of state legislation in this respect is to remedy the present de-
fects, but in such a manner as not to stunt possible beneficial expansion.
Illustrative of these inherent limitations and of the difficulty of reme-
dying defects by legislation is the current controversy concerning can-
cellation and renewal clauses in personal health insurance contracts.14
THE PROBLEM
In general, individual health and accident policies today are of two
basic types:"5 those which are written only for a stated term-almost
universally one year-and which must be renewed from period to period,
and those whose coverage extends for life, or until a stated age is reached
by the insured. The former type is designated term insurance and the
latter noncancellable insurance.1" The noncancellable type17 is consider-
risks are extremely cautious. Experience dictates that the only acceptable practice is to
"write out" liability on any serious disease or infirmity previously experienced by the
insured. It is argued that use of these riders (see note 56 infra for an example of a
rider) is a desirable practice, because it enables those who are "substandard" risks to
obtain some type of insurance, and that the insured "gets his money's worth," since the
illness that is eliminated by rider may make him more susceptible to, or may prolong
disability from other causes. FAULKNER, ACCIDENT AND HEALTH INSURANCE 17.3
(1940).
'See Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 29z (195o), and Drucker, op. cit. iupra note 1,
at 51.
14 Group, as opposed to individual and family, policies are not involved in the prob-
lem of cancellation and nonrenewal. Group insurance is a contract by the insurer with
a group, usually an employer-union, for the protection of members of the group, usually
employees. The insurer does not cancel with the group, for reasons with which this
article is not concerned 5 but as claims rise the insurer merely passes on the cost in the
form of a higher premium. See, MILLIMAN, Contract Provisions of Group Accident
and Sickness Insurance, in ACCIDENT AND SICKNESS INSURANCE I 14 (McCahan ed.
1954).
" Although health insurance policies may be divided into two types on the basis of
duration of contract, policies otherwise exhibit a wide variation, especially in coverage
provisions. BEST Co., ACCIDENT AND HEALTI GUIDE (1952) lists fifty fundamental
types of accident and health insurance policies.
" See generally, FAULKNER, op. cit. supra note 17 (i94o) 5 ACCIDENT AND SICKNESS
INSURANCE (McCahan ed. 1954); and RUBINOW, STANDARDS OF HEALTH INSURANCE
(±9±6).
" Noncancellable health insurance policies originated in 1907, but were not marketed
with success until the late 192o's. Lilly, Modern Trends in Accident and Health In-
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ably more expensive' 8 because a certain percentage of premiums must
be set aside each year to build up reserves against, first, the general
health deterioration which usually accompanies advancing age, and,
second, certain other contingencies which may affect the incidence and
amount of claims.'9 For example, either inflation or depression in the
economy will result in a drain on this reserve. 0
Term insurance, on the other hand, is the traditional form of health
insurance, 21 comprising the great majority of policies.2 It requires a
surance, [1927] ANNALS 145. This type of policy received a sharp setback in company
popularity due to the depression. See note 2o infra. However, recently the demand for
a noncancellable policy, and sounder actuarial knowledge, has tempted many companies
into this field. PERKINS, Underqriting Personal Non-cancellable Contracts, in ACCICENT
AND SICKNESS INSURANCE 149 (McCahan ed. 1954).
1" Generally, the premium cost of a noncancellable policy is between one-and-one-
half times and double that of a similar policy without the noncancellable provision.
Regan, Termination of Insurance Contracts, p. 3, Memorandum to the Oklahoma Legis-
lature, 2954. Moreover, the underwriting standards are considerably higher. For
example, while a physical examination is not usually required for term insurance, in
noncancellable insurance it is the rule. Id. at 3. But see SOMMER, op. cit. supra note
12, at 136. Therefore, between higher premiums and stricter standards, fewer people
are eligible for the protection such a policy would afford.
" The most illustrative of such factors is the moral hazard. In no other type of
insurance is it more within the power of the insured to control both the incidence and
amount of claims. Since the insurer ca.nrot cancel, and is disinclined to resist claims,
except in clear cases of "riding" the policy, he must make provision for the effects of
the hazard by higher premium rates. Faulkner, op. cit. supra note 12, at xa6. An-
other type of factor is change in the occupation or residence of the insured, which
renders him more subject to sickness or injury than formerly. A third factor is the
principle of adverse selection: those persons who fear or expect an impending serious
illness tend, despite higher premium rates, to select insurance which offers the greatest
amount of coverage and which is noncancellable.
" The adverse effects of an inflation upon health insurance with a fixed premium
rate are easily recognized. The effects of a depression were demonstrated when claim
volume increased one-third from 1929 to 1932, revealing the affinity between financial
distress and moral hazard. Health policies were converted wholesale into a type of
unemployment insurance. Concurrently, there was a falling off of premium income,
as many policies lapsed and new business was at a standstill. The pinch of these factors
forced many companies out of the field and necessitated reorganization of others. Faulk-
ner, op. cit. supra note 12, at 14.
" The writing of policies for a term has been in vogue since the inception of acci-
dent and health insurance in the i88o's. Faulkner, id at 7. Though the term principle
is familiar in fire and life insurance, rarely is the term so short, or so frequently em-
ployed for the purpose of unilateral termination of the policy by the insurer. In actual
practice, the renewal of a policy is a mere matter of form. In the light of this custom
of renewal, the policyholder often misunderstands the nature of his protection. See
note 28 infra.
22 It was estimated that in 1954 91.6% of all accident and health policies were
written on a term basis. Follmann, The A. & H. Cancellation "Problem," The Specta-
tor, July 955, p. I.
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much smaller reserve, since premiums can be set at figures which will
cover losses estimated to occur only during the current term.23  In addi-
tion, since all term policies contain renewal options,24 if any individual
insured's claims rise disproportionately above the estimated average,
the company, in its periodic re-evaluation of policyholders," can refuse
to renew at the end of the current term; or, if there is a cancellation
" The question as to what losses "occur" within the term constitutes a thorny problem
when, for example, a company refuses payment of a claim on the ground that the illness
or injury originated prior to the date that the insurance was taken out. The usual
clause excepting the insurer's liability for such losses reads: "[The Company hereby
insures] against loss . . . resulting from accidental bodily injuries sustained during the
term of this policy or . . .- resulting from sickness contracted and commencing during
the term of this policy. . . ." C.A.D.I.E., Form No. 673. Insurers argue that to include
coverage of such losses is to give fire insurance when the building is burning. Hanna,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 326. This analogy is manifestly unfair in a case where the
illness or injury perhaps originates prior to insurance, but is unknown to the insured,
or, if known, its seriousness is unsuspected by him. Moreover, consider a literal appli-
cation of the "pre-existing" illness clause in a case of heart trouble, where general
debilitation originates at the date of birth.
The only justification for such a clause, except in clear cases, is that without it
many people would not appreciate the need for insurance until they became sick. 13ET-
TFa BUSINESS BUREAU, FACTS ABOUT ACCIDENT AND HEALTH INSURANCE lo (1954).
The injustices (or as the insurance companies insist "misunderstandings") often brought
about by application of the clause have been one of the heated issues of health insurance.
A 1954 study found complaints concerning "pre-existing" conditions foremost in number
and importance. Hanna, id at 325. In response to this unfavorable criticism, the more
reputable companies effected a compromise by which a defense under the clause would
become "incontestable" by the company after the policy had been in force for three
years. RErrz, Standard Provisions-Personal Contracts, in ACCIDENT AND SICKNESS
INSURANCE 98, xo8 (McCahan ed. 1954): Statutes have been passed in some states
limiting these defenses to two years rather than three. Hanna, id. at 326.
" The privilege of the companies to avail themselves of these termination measures
is founded in contract and recognized by regulatory legislation. Uniform Standard
Provisions Act § 16 (1912) (adopted in all states), ACCIDENT AND SICKNESS INSURANCE,
Appendix A (McCahan ed. :954); Uniform Individual Accident and Sickness Policy
Provisions Law (1950) (adopted in thirty-five states), id., Appendix B. See Hanna,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 321.
Section 4(a) (3) of the latter act does require five days notice to the insured prior
to the exercise of either the cancellation or "option to renew" clause of the contract.
The theory of the five-day notice requirement is that the policyholder then has an oppor-
tunity to secure insurance elsewhere. Follmann, The Cancellation "Problem" in Health
and Accident Insurance, Monograph for the Bureau of Accident and Health Under-
writers, May, 1955, p. 1S. Though this provision is hardly a largess to the policy-
holder to begin with, even its small measure of protection serves little function, for, in
the majority of cases, the reasons which caused termination by one company would
operate to exclude him from obtaining insurance from another.
21 Such a periodic re-evaluation of policyholders is sound underwriting practice.
FAULKNER, op. cit. supra note iz, at 134-135.
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clause in the contract,26 the company can terminate the policy within the
current term by giving notice and returning the unearned premiums.
These cancellation and renewal clauses can be utilized for purposes other
than reduction of risk, howeveri for they function as inexpensive reliefs
against malingering and against misrepresentation by the insured as to
his physical condition."
Unfortunately, the insured public generally has not appreciated the
distinction between term and noncancellable insurance, nor has it been
aware of the precariousness of its position in view of these termination
provisions.28  Hence, when an erstwhile insured discovers that the com-
pany has terminated his policy after having paid a claim or having
otherwise received notice of declining health, his reaction is customarily
one of surprise and indignation. In many cases, the result does appear
manifestly unjust. For instance, in one recent situation a woman, who
had kept a policy for almost fifteen years without making a single claim
against the company, became ill and spent a week in the hospital. When
she sent her claim to the company she received a notice of nonrenewal,
in addition to a check in payment of the claim. She was then approach-
ing age sixty, and felt that "the time had come when [she] might need
2' Although the cancellation provision is statutorily available [see note 24 supra],
because of competition, few companies utilize it. Letter from the office of the Texas
Insurance Commissioner to the Duke Bar Journal, Nov. 2, 1955.
" It is true that fraud or a material misrepresentation on an application form is a
defense to a claim. VANCE, INSURANCE § 67 ( 3 d ed. i95i). These defenses are diffi-
cult to establish in a lawsuit, however5 and, because of the unfavorable publicity which
would result from a claim practice utilizing them, companies prefer the more expedient
alternative of cancellation or failure to renew. Interview with the North Carolina
legislative insurance counsel, Oct. as, 1955.
2' The education of the public as to the limitations of term insurance has been one
of the more awkward problems of the insurance industry. Without education, there is
bound to be unjustified reliance upon future protection. The problem is exacerbated by
high pressure salesmanship. State insurance commissioners, having the power to control
the language of a policy, require that a description of the termination provision appear
clearly both within the policy and on its "first page." NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
INSURANCE COMMSSSIONERS, RECOMMENDED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE RELATIVE TO
RENEVABILITY AND CANCELLATION PROVISIONS 1 (195Z). In addition, checks on mis-
leading advertising have been established. The insurance companies adopted self-regu-
latory measures after an investigation by the Federal Trade Commission in 1953 [Wall
Street Journal, Feb. 24, 1954, p. i, col. 8i Hanna, op. cit. supra note 7, at 324] and
the passage of a Louisiana statute requiring all health insurance advertising to include
a statement of the termination provisions. LA. REv. STAT., tit. 72, § sai 4A(i) (1950).
Both the Bureau of Accident and Health Underwriters and the Health and Accident
Underwriters Conference adopted a code of advertising ethics for their respective mem-
ber companies. Hanna, id. at 3z5.
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this insurance."29 She had, of course, assumed that the premiums paid
during healthier years were for protection in later life.80 Incidents of
this sort have inspired a vigorous opposition to the so-called health in-
surance "racket,' 1 and remedies have been sought from both the courts
and the legislatures.
JUDICIAL REmEDIES
On the whole, disappointed policyholders have met with little suc-
cess in the courts.82 Nonreneval and cancellation clauses are ordinarily
given effect according to the plain meaning of their terms,8 3 despite the
injustice of the result in many cases. Moreover, the courts have ex-
cluded evidence of the soliciting agent's misrepresentations, 4 and have
rejected the argument that an advance notice provision appurtenant to
a cancellation clause should be extended by implication to the nonrenewal
clause.35
29 Letter to North Carolina Rep. H. Clifton Blue, Oct. 8, 1954.
"Protection of this sort could be extended by a policy guaranteed renewable up to
age 65 [see note 66 infra], in which a higher premium is charged and a reserve set
aside so that the policy will be "paid up" at that age. Cf. Drucker, op. cit. supra note
i, at 55. At least one company is now marketing an experimental policy of this type.
Address by R. F. Killion, A Re-evaluation of Individual Accident and Health Insurance,
at Annual Meeting of the Bureau of Accident and Health Underwriters, Sept. 26, 1955.
" As examples of expressions in this vein: Don't Fall for Phony Health Insurance,
Coronet, June, 1951, p. 14; The Cancellation Racket, Greensboro [North Carolina]
Daily News, May 6, 1955, p. 8, cols. 1-2. For a collection of the charges against in-
surance companies, see Follmann, op. cit. supra note 24.
"See, generally, Annots. 119 A.L.R. 530 (1939) and 161 A.L.R. 193 (1946).
"2 Mut. Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n. v. Lyon, 95 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1938) ; Prescott
v. Mut. Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n., 133 Fla. 510, 183 So. 311 (1938); Massachusetts
Bonding & Ins. Co. v. McConnel, 50 Ga.App. 87, 176 S.E. 911 (1934); Hall v.
Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 48 Ga.App. 359, 172 S.E. 721 (1934); Mut. Benefit
Health & Ace. Ass'n. v. Caver, 169 Miss. 554, 152 So. 897 (1934) ; Ray v. Mut. Benefit
Health & Acc. Assn., 220 S.W.2d 6zz (Mo.App. 1949); National Bankers Life Ins.
Co. v. Bunnell, 227 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Civ.App. 195o ) ; American National Ins. Co. v.
Ball, 218 S.W. 71 (Tex.Civ.App. 9zo ); Redeman v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 215 Wis.
322, 254 N.W. 515 (934). Accord: Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 223 Ala.
571, 137 So. 414 (1932)-
"'Ray v. Mut. Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n., 220 S.W.2d 622 (Mo.App. 1949)
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Wooley, 179 S.W.zd 329 (Tex.Civ.App. 1944).
It has also been held that previous acceptance by agents of overdue premiums will not
affect a waiver of lapse and nonrenewal provisions so as to prevent a later exercise of
the option by the insurer. Commonwealth Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Nelligan, .20 S.W.2d
209 (Tex.Civ.App. 1949); National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Casillas, 63 S.W.zd 396
(Tex.Civ.App. 1933).
"5 Jordan v. Wash. Nat'l. Ins. Co., 219 Ark. 530, 243 S.W.zd 367 (1951); Ameri-
can National Ins. Co. v. Ball, 218 S.W. 71 (Tex.Civ.App. 1920); Peikins v. Asso-
ciated Indemnity Corp., 189 Wash. 8, 63 P.zd 499 (1936).
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Where an ambiguity can be found, however, the insured is in a some-
what better position, since it is well settled that the contracts must be
strictly construed against the insurer. For example, courts have had
no difficulty in holding a nonrenewal clause void on the ground that it
conflicted with the words "noncancellable" printed in bold type on the
face of the policy." Similarly, it has been held that a provision in a
policy providing for cumulative benefits depending on the length of
time the policy has been in effect conflicts with the nonrenewal clause
and renders it void.
3 8
Furthermore, the courts of at least one state have granted relief to
the insured even in the absence of any ambiguity in the contract provi-
sions. In one recent case,89 the insurer gave notice of lapse at a time
when premiums were not in default, and the evidence tended to show
that such notice was given with the intent of avoiding impending claims.
For this wrongful termination of the contract, the insured was allowed
to recover both actual and punitive damages, even though the insurer
was willing to continue the policy in effect.40 In another case in that
10Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U.S. 167, 174 (1936).
Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court, said: "The rule is settled that, in case of
ambiguity, that construction of the policy will be adopted which is most favorable to
the insured. The language employed is that of the company and it is consistent with
both reason and justice that any fair doubt as to the meaning of its own words should
be resolved against it."
7 De Land v. Fidelity Health & Ace. Mut. Ins. Co., 325 Mich. 9, 37 N.W.2d 693
(949). The court rejected the argument that the word "non-cancellable" meant non-
cancellable during any term for which premiums had been paid, holding that it meant
noncancellable for the duration of the policy. See Schultz v. Benefit Ass'n. of Railway
Employees of Chicago, 175 S.C. 182, 178 S.E. 867 (1935).
Where the noncancellable provision specifically states that it is effective during
periods for which the premiums have been paid, it does not conflict with the nonrenewal
option clause. Smith v. Mut. Benefit Health & Ace. Ins. Co., 1o F. Supp. 11o (W.D.
Okla. 1933) ; J. H. Christie & Sons v. Moore, 48 Ga.App. 359, 172 S.E. 721 (934.)
Mut. Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n. v. Caver, 169 Miss. 554, 152 So. 897 (934.); Ray
v. Mut. Benefit Health & Ace. Ins. Co., 220 S.W.zd 622 (Mo.App. 1949).
38 Cohen v. Mut. Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n., 134 N.J.Eq. 499, 36 A.zd z88
(1944); Harwell v. Mut. Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n., 207 S.C. 150, 35 S.E.2d x6o
(1945). The latter case quoted American Indemnity Co. v. Mexia Independent School
Dist., 47 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex.Civ.App. 1932): "Insurance companies cannot thus
couch their contracts in doubtful language and allow their salesmen to employ the con-
struction most favorable to the insured to catch the unwary, and then, when the com-
pany is hailed into court, claim the benefit of the construction most favorable to it."
Contra: Mut. Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n. v. Lyon, 95 F.2d 5z8 (Sth Cir. 1938);
Prescott v. Mut. Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n., 133 Fla. 510, 183 So. 311 (-938).
10 Davis v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 88 S.E.2d 658 (S.C. 1955).
"°The court quoted from Shuler v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y. of U.S., 84
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state,4 ' after an agent had received a request from the insured for a claim
blank, he discontinued his weekly collection calls. The policy provided
that default in premium payments for more than four weeks would
result in lapse. A lapse occurred, and the insured brought an action for
fraudulent cancellation. The court held that evidence of a deliberate
departure by the insurer's agent from his established custom of collec-
tion was sufficient to raise a jury question on the issue of fraud, and that,
on a favorable verdict, the plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages.42
The limitations on the above-enumerated judicial remedies must be
recognized, however. Insurers can easily delete or rephrase provisions
which conflict with the renewal clause. Also, a willingness to find
fraudulent termination and allow punitive damages, while providing
the insured with some present compensation, affords little protection
with regard to future illnesses.
LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
The inability of the judiciary to contrive any adequate remedy has
prompted action in the state legislatures; and, within the past year, a
significant number of bills have been introduced, purporting to effect
some solution to the problem.48 All are basically similar in that they
restrict, to some extent, cancellation and nonrenewal by the insurer.
The various proposals differ, however, as to the length of time during
S.C. 485, 490 193 S.E. 46, 48 (1937): "By the weight of authority, where an insurer
wrongfully cancels, repudiates, or terminates the contract of insurance, the insured may
at once pursue either of three courses: (i) He may elect to treat the policy as still in
force, and let the test of the validity of the cancellation or repudiation wait until the
policy is payable and is sued on; (2) he may sue in equity to set aside the cancellation,
and to have the policy declared to be valid and in force; or (3) he may maintain an
action at law to recover damages for the wrongful cancellation or repudiation." 88
S.E.zd at 659-6o.
" Hutcherson v. Pilgrim Health & Life Ins. Co., 87 S.E.zd 685 (S.C. 2955).
42 Citing Riley v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn., 184 S.C. 383, 19z S.E. 394
(i937), and Simmons v. Service Life & Health Ins. Co., 223 S.C. 407, 76 S.E.zd 288
(1953). Defendant insurer offered in its answer to reinstate the policy. It then argued,
on appeal, that the offer eliminated any damage plaintiff might have suffered by reason
of the cancellation. Said the court: "This position cannot be sustained. The trial court
in effect held that the offer to reinstate the policy and remit the premiums due and in
arrears presented a jury issue, and this issue was presented to the jury along with the
other issues in the case." 87 S.E.zd at 687, 688.
4There have been io bills requiring notice before cancellation or nonrenewal.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-251.2 (Supp. 1955), is of this type. See notes 51 and 5z infra.
There have been 14 proposals requiring all policies to be noncancellable from the date
of issue; and 26 proposals provide that all policies must be noncancellable after they
have been in force for a certain period. [See, e.g., the Florida proposal. Note 44
infra]. Follmann, op. cit. supra note 24, at 15.
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which such restraint is imposed; and they may be divided, generally, into
four categories.
The most comprehensive legislation would require all health insur-
ance policies issued within the state to be noncancellable.4" Several bills
of this type have been introduced 45 but, as yet, none has been adopted.
Although this legislation would extend much greater protection to in-
sureds, its benefits are outweighed by the inevitable premium increase,
which would deprive a disproportionately greater number of people of
any protection at all.46  A solution embodying substantially the same
benefits without the concomitant disadvantages of prohibitive rate in-
creases would obviously be more desirable.
In the second category, an Ohio statute. which becomes effective in
1956, will forbid cancellation of any policy within the calendar year for
which it was issued. This statute is subject to two criticisms: It does not
affect the nonrenewal option,4s and it forestalls termination for too short
a period adequately to protect the insured. Similarly, a third type of
proposal requires one year's notice of cancellation if the policy has been
in effect for a year or more.49 It is at least arguable that the one year
"E.g., Fla. H.B. xi: "No life insurance company nor any insurance company writ-
ing accident and sickness policies shall cancel a policy of insurance after five years from
the date of issuance, except for nonpayment of premiums."
"See note 43 supra.
"[The characteristics of noncancellable insurance] include the necessity for higher
premiums, the establishment of policy reserves, more stringent underwriting practices,
more restrictive policy contracts and benefits, added hazard to the financial resources of
the company, less sales appeal, and more limited availability to the potential insuring
[sic] buying public. Follmann, op. cit. supra note 24, at 17. Insurance commissioners
agree. E.g.: "[A]ithough insurance policies can be made non-cancellable as to any
particular group falling within any age or health classification, such an arrangement
might adversely affect the interests of the average policyholder. . . . [I]t might be
that the necessary premium for the coverage would be so burdensome as to be prohibi-
tive in the case of the average person." Letter from Albert F. Jordan, Superintendent
of Insurance for the District of Columbia, to the Duke Bar Journal, Oct. 27, 1955.
Also: "We concede that it would be desirable for all accident and sickness policies to
be written on a non-cancellable basis but the practicalities of the situation are that this
just can't be done at a premium rate which the average person is willing to pay."
Letter from Samuel E. Orebaugh, Deputy Commissioner of Insurance for the State of
Iowa, to the Duke Bar Journal, Nov. 1, 1955.
'
1 OHiO REy. CODE ANN. tit. 39, § 3923.04 (Page -954).
Even though deprived of the privilege of cancellation within the term, the insurer
can still refuse to renew at the end of the term. Since the renewal and cancellation rights
are complementary, effective regulation of them must be mutually inclusive.
" Wis. H.B. 616A, a proposed amendment to Wis STAT. § 204.31(3) (b) (8) (i953),
states: "The insurer may cancel this policy at any time by written notice to the insured,
or mailed to his last address as shown by the records of the insurer stating when, not
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cancellation provision applies also to the renewal option; but, in any
event, this statute likewise offers no long-term protection against ter-
mination.
RECENT NORTH CAROLINA LEGIsLATIoN- LIMITED
CANCELLABLE" INSURANCE
A new North Carolina statute,50 representing the fourth type of
legislation, provides for a graduated period of notice before nonrenewal
or cancellation can become effective." The period is proportionate to
the length of time the policy has been in force, and may range from
thirty days to two years."2 The rationale of this statute is that the length
of time during which the insured has relied on the policy should govern
the length of the notice period.
The insurance companies have asserted a determined opposition to
this legislation. They argue, first, that the incidence of cancellation at
less than five days thereafter, such cancellation shall be effective, except that if such
policy has been in force for one year or more, such cancellation shall not be effective
for at least x months... '
°N.C. Sess. Laws 1955 c. 886, creating N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-261.2 (Supp. 1955) ,
and repealing § 58-z5x.x, the uniform 5-day cancellation notice provision.
"' The statute applies specifically to nonrenewal only, and there is no section dealing
with cancellation clauses as such. Section 58-25i.2(z) states: "No insurance company
issuing individual or blanket family hospitalization or accident and health policies of
insurance shall have the right to unilaterally restrict coverage, reduce benefits, or increase
rates upon any contract of hospitalization or accident and health insurance which is
subject to the provisions of this Act except as provided herein." Perhaps this language
is sufficient to make the nonrenewal provisions applicable to cancellation clauses. Cf. 33
N.C.L. REV. 556, 557 (955): "Certainly any right of cancellation on shorter notice
than is required for nonrenewal is contrary to the spirit of C. 886; and possibly the
court would hold that the chapter by implication forbids any cancellation at all once
the annual premium has been paid."
" "Every individual or blanket family hospitalization policy and accident and health
policy, other than noncancellable or nonrenewable policies, issued in North Carolina
after January i, 1956 shall include the following provision:
"Renewability: This policy is renewable at the option of the policyholder unless
sufficient notice of nonrenewal is given the policyholder in writing by the insurer.
"Sufficient notice shall be, during the first year of any policy, or during the first year
following any lapse and reinstatement, a period of thirty days prior to the premium due
date. After one continuous year of coverage and acceptance of premium for any por-
tion of the second or subsequent year sufficient notice shall be a number of full months
most nearly equivalent to one-fourth the number of months of continuous coverage from
the first anniversary of the date of issue or reinstatement, to the date of mailing of such
notice: Provided no period of required notice shall exceed two years." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-25-.2 (Supp. 1955).
It should be noted that C. 886 applies only to individual and blanket policies issued
after January i, x956; it does not apply to extant policies which are rene'wed after that
date.
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present is so insignificant as to constitute no problem, certainly not
enough to justify state regulation 53 and they rely implicitly upon sta-
tistical studies which show that only a minute percentage of total
policies in force are terminated by the companies within a given year.54
Even assuming that these statistics are meaningful, they represent a
substantial number of persons who have been deprived of insurance
protection. 4a In addition, three factors render them inappropriate and
misleading. (I) The base is too large. A ratio of cancellations to the
number of insureds who submit substantial claims would certainly be
more illuminating. (2) Since the statistics represent only a one-year
period, they do not reflect the cumulative effect of cancellation.55
(3) In actual practice, companies, because of competition, prefer not to
cancel, but rather to exclude liability for the objectionable disease and
continue the policy5 6 This rider-out is, in practical effect, a pro tanto
cancellation which is not reflected in the statistics.
" See Follmann, op. cit. supra note 24, at 3. In 1954 the Louisiana Insurance Com-
missioner sent questionnaires to all other insurance commissioners for information as to
complaints about health insurance. In the answers received, complaints about cancella-
tion or renewal accounted for S% of total. On the basis of this and the 1953 North
Carolina survey [note 54 infra], one insurance spokesman concludes: "[T]he quantita-
tive results clearly indicate that 'cancellation' is not a problem of any great magnitude."
Follmann, id. at so. However, a state commissioner, after a survey of cancellation and
nonrenewal in his state, reports: "The prevalence of cancellation is astounding." Letter
from Thomas J. Gillooly, Insurance Commissioner for the State of West Virginia, to
the Duke Bar Journal, Dec. 12, 1955. Cf. Hanna, op. cit. supra note 7, at 3z5:
"Undoubtedly the termination problem has been overemphasized, but currently it is one
of the most serious legislative and public relations difficulties."
"4 The North Carolina Insurance Commissioner conducted a survey of cancellation
and nonrenewal in 1953, sending questionnaires to the 219 insurance companies, fraternal
organizations and hospital associations licensed to sell health and accident insurance in
the state. The results were tabulated and a report issued covering statistics for the 94
companies which sold individual term policies in North Carolina during the year 1952.
"Cancellation" here covers nonrenewal, but not terminations because of attainment of
maximum age, non-payment of premiums, or collection of maximum benefits.
59 companies reported one or more cancellations in 1952. A total of 386z cancel-
lations was reported, which was 0.3658% of all North Carolina policyholders. 1334
cancellations were motivated by deterioration of health of the insured, and 966 others
by "+excessive claims" on the part of the insured. Cancellations for all other reasons
totaled 156z. Memorandum to Waldo C. Cheek, North Carolina Insurance Commis-
sioner, Oct. 22 1953.
"'0A total of 1zo,ooo in the year i95z by the 94 companies covered by the North
Carolina survey alone. There are 700 companies in the accident and health insurance
business. Hanna, op. cit. supra note 7, at 318.
" Since cancellation occurs continually, yearly statistics do not reflect the true proba-
bility that any given insured will be cancelled at some future date.
r' In a recent case, a woman collected a claim against her insurer on an operation for
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Furthermore the insurers predict that this legislation will actually
result in increased incidence of termination in borderline cases, since it
will occasion practices of anticipatory cancellation of policyholders who
display signs of developing into bad risksY7  Perhaps the statute will
have such a tendency, but any evaluation of this possibility as an argu-
ment against it must take into account the extent to which such antici-
patory cancellation would be feasible in view of the risk distribution
factor essential to a competitive insurance business. 8  Obviously the
insurers cannot go very far in eliminating prospective bad risks with-
out cutting into the broad base of policyholders necessary to sustain the
losses resulting from unanticipated bad risks.
The companies also contend that the most substantial cause of can-
cellation and nonrenewal is the practices of lax or unscrupulous agents,
who negligently or deliberately insure bad risks in order to profit from
the commissions."9 These practices, of course, are more of a problem
with companies which do not offer their agents renewal commissions.
Consequently, the insurers argue, a better solution would be the require-
ment of renewal commissions60 and a stricter regulation of agents gen-
the removal of a tumor. Shortly thereafter, the company sent her a rider form to sign,
for waiver of "any claim for indemnity on account of any loss or disability hereafter
sustained which shall be caused or contributed to by tumor, tumorous growth or neo-
plasm." A letter accompanying the rider informed her that:
"This is a renewable term policy and it covers any loss within the policy provisions
which begins during the period of time for which premium has been accepted. The
company, however, shares with you the right of not renewing the policy at the end of
that period.
"Our Membership Committee has agreed on a plan of policy renewal with a pro-
vision waiving liability for any future disability caused by the condition named in the
enclosed rider. Under this plan, we have given the insured an opportunity of main-
taining the policy for other types of disabilities rather than to discontinue the policy in
its entirety." The policyholder allowed her policy to lapse. Letter to N.C. Rep. H.
Clifton Blue, Oct. 8, 1954.
"' Interview with the office of the North Carolina Insurance Commissioner, Oct. 21,
1955.
"' "This principle of distributing risk is the basis of all insurance." ACKERMAN,
INSURANCE 4 (Rev. ed. 1938). See WILLETTr, THE ECONOMIc THEORY OF RISK AND
INSURANCE, Ch. 1 (1951). In dealing with health risks, there are so many unknown
factors to be accounted for that practically every insured, regardless of present health,
can be classed as "borderline" with regard to future illness.
" Interview with the North Carolina legislative counsel for the Bureau of Accident
and Health Underwriters, Oct. i x, 19 55. Cf. Follmann, op. cit. supra note 24, at z6:
"Over-use, or abuse, of the right to discontinue the insurance might come as a result of
lax or insufficient underwriting."
"o Most companies do provide some renewal commissions for their agents. Interview,
note 57 supra. However, in determining the amount of renewal commissions, the coin-
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erally.6 This argument, however, discounts the fact that bad agent
practices is only one of several important causes of the problem." In
addition, the North Carolina legislation will have the collateral effect
of discouraging such practicesi for insurers, faced with the enforced
continuation of bad risks for as long as two years, will have to exercise
a higher degree of care in the selection of policyholders.
Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, the insurers argue that, al-
though only a few carriers actually abuse the cancellation and nonrewal
privileges,63 the law will adversely affect all companies, as well as the
public, since premiums must necessarily be raised to cover the forced
continuation of bad risks. A partial answer to this argument is that
the more reputable companies, which at present have a smaller ratio of
cancellations to total policies, will not require a sizeable premium in-
crease. But even these companies will experience some increase in
costs6 4 for they will be deprived of the use of cancellation and nonre-
panies must consider that the agent who can rely on renewal commissions has less of a
motivation for acquiring new business. See FAULKNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 212.
For this reason, any legislative program attacking "bad agent" practices by requiring
renewal commissions should avoid too great an infringement upon matters of internal
company management.
"1As an alternative measure to H.B. 96 [now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-251.2 (Supp.
1955)], the insurers supported S.B. 351, which was also enacted, and is now incor-
porated into N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-41 (Supp. 1955). It provides that no insurance
agent may be licensed in the state after May 6, 1955, unless he has been a resident for
at least twelve months prior to the application for licensing, or posts a $iooo bond with
the Commissioner of Insurance. Failure to continue as a resident for one year is the
only ground for forfeiture of the bond. This residence requirement is intended to remedy
the abuses of transitory canvassing. Health and accident insurance agents must post an
additional $5oo bond--a requirement unrelated to residence. This bond is forfeited
upon a finding by the Commissioner that the agent has "willfully misrepresented the
terms" of a policy. Cf. a companion section of S.B. 351 [now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-
54.4(9) (Supp. -955)], relating to advertising of health and accident policies.
'2 Follmann, op. cit. supra note 24 at 6-8, lists 13 reasons, none of which specifically
concerns agent practices.
"1 The North Carolina survey [note 54 s pra] showed that eleven companies, which
insured nearly one-third of all policyholders in the state, were responsible for more than
two-thirds of the total cancellations. Their cancellation rate was 0.8478%, as compared
with o.x616% for the remaining 83 companies. In particular, these ii companies
reported 993 cancellations for health deterioration, as against 341 for the remaining 83
companies; and 839 cancellations for excessive claims, as against 127 among the remain-
ing companies. The ii companies reported 378 cancellations for moral hazard, pre--
existing conditions, change of occupation, etc., as against 404 for the other 83. Memo-
randum to Charles F. Gold, North Carolina Insurance Commissioner, Aug. 5, 1954.
" Although no exact figures are presently available, one company estimates a io%
rate increase in North Carolina effective January i, 1956, and adds: "We understand
that this estimate on our part is in line with that of other carriers." Letter from Herbert
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newal privileges as inexpensive reliefs against malingering and fraud."
Another observation seems pertinent here. The North Carolina
statute removes, to an extent, the incident of cancellation and nonrenewal
from term insurance, with the result that new policies written in that
state are not term policies within the traditional definition; nor are they
completely noncancellable. Instead, they constitute a hybrid form which
may appropriately be designated "limited-cancellable." Much of the
actuarial knowledge or underwriting experience of each of the older
forms is inapplicable to this new policy type, and only through trial and
error can the insurers arrive at any sound underwriting basis for limited-
cancellable insurance.
A final appraisal of this legislation must be made by weighing the
benefits of protection to policyholders against the detriment of increased
costs of insurance. Such an appraisal can be made only at some future
time, when the net effects of the legislation can be more adequately de-
termined. But, for the present, the North. Carolina statute does seem
commendable as the first affirmative step toward remedying the injus-
tices of the termination problem. Even now, however, it is apparent
that this legislative scheme will not give completely adequate protection,
as cancellation can become effective after a relatively short period of




Probably the most auspicious effect of the recent rash of legislative
proposals is the challenge they present to the health insurance companies.
The incentive to minimize the problem and thus avert outside regulation
has quite recently inspired a number of experimental programs and
policies. The most promising of these, and the one which most closely
approximates the ideal of minimum cost with maximum protection, both
B. Thompson, Vice-President of the Bankers Life and Casualty Co., to the Duke Bar
Journal, Nov. 30, 1955. Another company stated only that "our premiums are going
-to increase considerably." Letter from W. B. Clark, Vice-President of the Carolina
Casualty Insurance Co., to the Duke Bar Journal, Nov. 1S, 1955.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-a51.2() (Supp. 1955) provides: "The insurer upon a show-
ing of inadequacy of the rates chargeable on such policies upon which notice of non-
renewal has been given, and a finding as to the same by the Commissioner of Insurance,
-may increase such rates with the approval of the Commissioner."
"5 See note 27 supra. In addition, other legitimate grounds for cancellation are
unavailable, e.g. change of occupation and moral hazard. See note i9 supra. Perhaps
future legislation regulating cancellation and nonrenewal should define and exclude
-termination for cause. See note 75 infra.
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in coverage and security of contract, is the "guaranteed renewable"
policy."' This type is not terminable by the insurer during the life of
the insured, or until he reaches a specified age j 7 and its distinctive fea-
ture is an adjustable premium scale. Premiums may be raised to main-
tain reserves, but only uniformly within age brackets or other designated
classifications."' Thus, if losses become so great that premiums paid in
at the current rate are insufficient to cover them, the insurer can adjust
its premium scale and continue paying benefits.
This guaranteed renewable-form is preferable to the noncancellable
type in that, of the two factors contributing to the high cost of the latter
insurance, one is eliminated entirely-namely, the increment to premium
rates necessitated by the uncertainy of general economic conditions in
the future. 9 The other factor, increased losses due to the general health
deterioration which usually accompanies old age, cannot be eliminated.
Instead the burden must rest upon the insurance companies to correlate
the selection of risks with the level of premiums so as to extend the
greatest possible protection to the greatest number of persons. The
guaranteed renewable policy itself assures the former objective-that is,
the greatest possible protection; and competition among the companies
will definitely tend to accomplish the latter by adjusting premium rates
at the optimum level. Also, to the extent that competition fails of that
o This type of policy, first offered two years ago, has received an enthusiastic re-
sponse from insurance men and commissioners alike. An acknowledged authority on
this problem adds a caveat, however, after discussing guaranteed renewable contracts
and other recent experiments: "It is not yet possible to evaluate these experiments.
Accident and health insurance is a business of delayed experience reactions. Economic
swings are vital to its success or failure. Many years, and certainly a full completion
of an economic cycle, are required to adequately test the result of any new decision,
coverage, or experiment." Follmann, The Right of Discontinuance, Best's Insurance
News, Oct. 1954, p. 77.
"' Available sample policies indicate that most are guaranteed renewable only to a
stated age, and that this age is usually 65.
" Other presumably valid classifications would include sex, occupation, outstanding
disabilities, etc. Follmann, op. cit. supra note 66, at 765 Hanna, op. cit. supra note 7, at
325.
The following is an illustrative guaranteed renewable clause: "Until the Insured
reaches his 6 5 th birthday this policy is renewable at the option of the Insured by payment
in advance, or during the grace period . . . , of premium at the Company's premium
rate it force at the time of rene'wal for policies bearing form No. - and applicable
to the [Insured at his age] on the effective date of coverage under this policy." Con-
tinental Casualty Co., form AP oz2. [Emphasis added.]
One company has recently experimented with a policy in which the premium
periodically increases at stated intervals. Follmann, supra, at 76.
" See note i9 supra and accompanying text.
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purpose, supplementary legislation can spur the companies to better un-
derwriting practices. 70
CONCLUSION
A statute embodying a guaranteed renewable policy form would
probably be an improvement upon current legislative proposals directed
at the injustices of cancellation and nonrenewal. It is not recommended
as an immediate step,"- however, because the actuarial knowledge essen-
tial to an intelligent determination of the standards to which insurers
must conform is, at present, insufficient. Comprehensive legislation may
be feasible in the future, when such information becomes available;
whether or not it will then be necessary will depend on the extent to
which the termination problem exists at that time.
In the interim, the companies, driven by competition 72 and the real
threat of restrictive regulation, can do much to ameliorate the problem. 7
The responsibility for compelling company adherence to this objective
70 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 58-41 (Supp. 1955), discussed in note 61 supra, is illustrative.
"The primary argument of the insurance companies against legislation regulating
termination practices is that the premium rise will outweigh all benefits that might be
achieved. See notes 46 and 64 supra. The degree to which this will be true, of course,
will vary with the amount of restriction imposed; but, at any rate, it is not thought to
be as great as the companies argue. Instead, perhaps such regulation would compel tile
companies to meet the problem by increased efficiency. In the field of individual and
family health policies the companies average only 48% of the premium dollar in pay-
ment of claims (as opposed to 8o% in group policies), the rest going for agents' com-
missions and administrative expenses. Follmann, Accident and Health Developments in
1954, Weekly Underwriter, Dec. 1954, p. 2. The most reputable companies pay only
6o% in claims [Letter from the Educator's Mutual Insurance Co. to the Duke Bar
Journal, Oct. 2z, 1955], while some companies pay only 33%. Interview with H.
Clifton Blue, Nov. 11, 1955. Even the federal government could distribute tax reve-
nues as benefits with more economy than this. Insurance in this field serves a legitimate
function, especially when there is a deductible feature based on the principle that in-
surance should pay only those dollars which a person, by normal budgeting, would be
unable to pay [see note xx supra] ; but it is not thought that society will long tolerate
inefficiency in a field so affected with the public interest. See EPSTEIN, INSECURITY, A
CHALLENGE TO AMERICA 125 (Rev. ed. 1938).
72 Since all companies use the same basic actuarial data, competition in the health
field has not taken the form of rate cutting, but instead has been concentrated on extend-
ing better service to a greater number of policyholders. FAULKNER, op. cit. supra note
iz, at zo. At present there are 700 carriers in the field [Hanna, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 318], and competition among them for the remaining policyholders stiffens constantly.
7' The ability and willingness of the companies to regulate themselves is demonstrated
by their support of such legislation as the Uniform Fair Trade Practices Act and the
Unauthorized Insurers Process Act [Hanna, op. cit. supra note 7, at 33z], by their
sponsorship of the three-year "incontestable" clause as to pre-existing illnesses [see note
23 supra], and by such self-regulatory measures as advertising codes [see note z8 supra].
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rests with the state insurance commissioners; and it is their responsibility
to recommend limited measures to the legislatures which will impel
insurers to develop a solution consistent with both the public interest and
the limitations of voluntary insurance. 4 If the commissioners do not
initiate and enforce some type of legislative leverage' with which to
secure a "voluntary" solution by the companies, state legislatures will
continue to adopt comprehensive regulation as an answer to the prob-
lem. In the light of present public demand and the incubus of federal
intervention,7 1 such a conclusion appears inescapable.
GERALD R. GIBBONS
JOHN D. JOHNSTON, JR.
Termination practice, however, is much more fundamental in term insurance than the
above matters. The extent to which the companies are capable of reappraising and
revising the rate structure in their industry is, at present, conjectural. That some of'
them have accepted this challenge by affirmative steps is attested by the recent initiation
of experimental policies. See note 68 supra.
" A committee appointed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
together with an All-Industry committee, is presently studying the problem of cancella-
tion and nonrenewal. The final report from this committee is expected in mid-t956.
"'The NAIC and All-Industry committee [note 74 supra] has the opportunity to
recommend curative legislation. In this respect, we submit the following three proposals
as possible recommendations:
(i) The present unlimited privilege of cancellation within a term has been subject
to abuse and should be made exercisable only for cause. It is not a necessary adjunct of
term insurance, and the more reputable companies have voluntarily restricted its exer-
cise. Of course, the definition of good cause presents drafting and enforcement problems5
but at least it is certain that deterioration of health should be excluded. Adoption of
this proposal would extend the period of insurer liability to the end of the term, and
the anticipated higher claim ratio would force the companies to adopt better under-
writing standards and to reduce operating expense.
(z) Restrictions should be imposed on advertising and agent misconduct. The in-
surers have already shown a favorable disposition toward control of advertising prac-
tices [see note z8 supra], and the agent problem can be partially alleviated by legislation
similar to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-751z2 (Supp. 1955). See note 6i supra.
(3) The goal of more efficient company management can best be accomplished
through closer supervision by state insurance commissioners. Closer supervision requires
broader investigatory powers than are now available, especially with regard to the
number of and reasons for current cancellations. Not only should the commissioners
have the power to compel disclosure of such data, but they should also be given some
type of concomitant sanction to compel the termination of undesirable practices.
"0 Federal intervention can take either of two forms: First, compulsory health in-
surance legislation or the Federal Reinsurance Bill. See note i supra. Second, direct
federal regulation of insurance. The power here would derive from the commerce
clause of the Federal Constitution as interpreted in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Assoc., 3z U.S. 533 (1944). Cf. 59 STAT. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 01z
(.952).
